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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes both sides of the U.S. debate concerning the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was rejected by the U.S. Senate in 1999, and which has 
attracted renewed interest under the Barack Obama administration.  Significant events in 
international politics have changed the prospects of nuclear proliferation since 1999.  
Scientists and engineers have improved methods for verifying treaty compliance and 
ensuring the safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons.  Proponents of the CTBT 
continue to view it as crucial to nuclear non-proliferation efforts and effectively verifiable 
with minimal effects on the U.S. strategic deterrence posture.  Meanwhile, skeptics 
regarding the treaty continue to view it as unverifiable and/or unenforceable and 
detrimental to U.S. strategic deterrence and non-proliferation efforts.  Technical 
advancements alone are not likely to sway the opinions of senators who voted against 
CTBT ratification in 1999.  If President Obama wishes to pursue CTBT ratification as he 
has stated, his administration will need to gain bipartisan support by compromising on 
some issues and establishing safeguards against the risks of the treaty. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION................................................................1 
B. IMPORTANCE................................................................................................1 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS ................................................................3 
D. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND....................................................................5 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................8 
F. METHODS AND SOURCES........................................................................10 
G. THESIS OVERVIEW ...................................................................................10 
II. PROPONENTS OF THE CTBT ..............................................................................13 
A. OPENING ARGUMENTS............................................................................13 
B. NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.............................14 
C. CREDIBILITY OF U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE ..............................17 
D. VERIFICATION............................................................................................18 
E. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................19 
III. OPPONENTS OF THE CTBT .................................................................................21 
A. OPENING ARGUMENTS............................................................................21 
B. PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS .......................................22 
C. CREDIBILITY OF U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE ..............................23 
D. VERIFICATION............................................................................................25 
E. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................26 
IV. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1999..............................................................................27 
A. AFTERMATH OF THE SENATE REJECTION ......................................27 
B. GEOPOLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS........................................................28 
1. China and Russia ...............................................................................28 
2. India and Pakistan .............................................................................30 
3. Iran......................................................................................................32 
4. North Korea........................................................................................33 
5. Interpretations of Geopolitical Developments.................................34 
C. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARGUMENT FOR RATIFICATION........37 
D. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARGUMENT AGAINST 
RATIFICATION............................................................................................40 
E. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................43 
V. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT DEBATE ...........................................................45 
A. THE UNITED STATES SENATE ...............................................................45 
B. SAFEGUARDS ..............................................................................................47 
C. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................49 
APPENDIX 1999 CTBT VOTE IN THE U.S. SENATE .....................................51 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................53 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................59 
 viii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ix
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. States That Have Not Ratified the CTBT. .........................................................7 
Table 2. Hypothetical Voting Required by Current U.S. Senate to Ratify CTBT.........46 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
CTBT   Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
IAEA   International Atomic Energy Agency 
MTCR   Missile Technology Control Regime 
NPT   Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
NSG   Nuclear Suppliers Group 
NSPD   National Security Presidential Directive 
WMD   Weapons of Mass Destruction 
 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1
                                                
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines two questions. What are the different points of view about 
the key issues concerning U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT)?  To what extent have new arguments been advanced since the United States 
Senate rejected the treaty in 1999?  President Barack Obama has stated that he will 
pursue the Senate’s advice and consent for ratification of the CTBT, which would 
prohibit all nuclear explosive testing.  States party to the treaty would not be permitted to 
conduct nuclear explosive tests of any yield and would be subject to international 
verification regimes after the treaty entered into force.  Proponents of the treaty argue that 
it would serve as a valuable tool for combating the proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
represent a significant step toward nuclear disarmament.1  Opponents of the treaty argue 
that it would jeopardize the national security of the United States by eroding the 
credibility of its nuclear weapons, thereby decreasing the effectiveness of the U.S. 
deterrence posture and increasing the likelihood of nuclear proliferation.2 
B. IMPORTANCE 
If the Obama administration desires to secure ratification of the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty prior to the May 2010 review conference for the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the President will have to re-submit the treaty 
to the United States Senate for another round of debate toward that end.  The debate will 
probably be contentious and will rely on the testimonies of senior leaders within the 
Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the scientific community.  The 
results of a vote, if taken by the Senate, may or may not support ratification of the CTBT. 
 
1 Jonathan Medalia, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Pro and Con, Congressional Research Service 
Report for Congress, RL20351 (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 28 June 2005), 2. 
2 Ibid. 
 2
Ten years have passed since the last Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty debate in the 
United States Senate.  Technology has advanced, U.S. nuclear weapons have continued to 
age, and the geopolitical environment has changed dramatically.  The arguments and 
analyses presented in 1999 will no longer suffice, and the importance of the CTBT to 
U.S. national security demands a new critical analysis of its pros and cons.  It is therefore 
important for senior leaders within the Department of Defense to understand the key 
issues involved with the CTBT to make informed decisions and provide accurate counsel 
to decision-making authorities. 
As with certain other international arms control measures, the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty could result in reduced military capability, and this might affect U.S. 
central and extended deterrence policies.  CTBT proponents maintain that other states 
would also sacrifice military capability because they also could no longer ensure the 
reliability of their weapons or develop improved warhead designs through testing.  (This 
argument assumes that no significant testing could be undertaken without detection, and 
that detection would be followed by effective action to enforce compliance.)  Inevitably, 
CTBT proponents argue, all states will be forced to replace aging weapons with newer, 
untested designs or to disband their nuclear arsenals completely.  CTBT advocates favor 
the latter outcome because they regard the CTBT as an important step toward global 
nuclear disarmament.  Skeptics regarding the CTBT have expressed concern that 
decisions to rely on untested designs or to abandon nuclear forces could affect strategic 
deterrence, upset the balance of international power, and endanger U.S. national security. 
The Department of Defense must also consider the implications for its nuclear 
forces should the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty enter into force.  The United States has 
observed a moratorium on nuclear testing since 1992, but ratification of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would have several political and military implications 
affecting the Department of Defense.  The treaty’s entry into force—or a continued 
moratorium on testing—could have long-term consequences for international security.  




                                                
thereby reducing international tensions and the threat of nuclear attacks.  Opponents of 
the CTBT have argued that lack of nuclear testing could undermine the credibility of the 
U.S. nuclear deterrent and thereby increase the likelihood of future conflicts. 
Strategic planners within the Department of Defense must account for the long-
term effects of international arms control treaties, including the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty.  Realistic expectations regarding nuclear weapons performance should be 
factored into wartime contingency plans based on current numbers of deployed weapons 
and an accurate assessment of their probable capacity to destroy intended targets.  The 
Department of Defense must also be prepared to deal with the more immediate effects of 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty’s entry into force, such as international on-site 
inspection teams and verification regimes. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
Testing has always been an important aspect of any weapons development 
program because it builds confidence in the reliability of system designs.  The lack of 
comprehensive testing may eventually erode confidence in the reliability of nuclear 
weapons.  As United States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it in October 2008, 
“there is absolutely no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number 
of weapons in our [nuclear] stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or 
pursuing a modernization program.”3 
The first problem presented by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to its nuclear-
armed states parties is how to maintain a credible deterrent without testing nuclear 
weapons.  The United States Department of Energy has conducted its Stockpile 
Stewardship Program since 1996 in response to this problem.4  The deterrent value of 
U.S. nuclear weapons has not been profoundly affected by the moratorium on testing 
 
3 Robert Gates, "Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in the 21st Century," Speech at the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 28 October 2008: 6, available at 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/1028_transcrip_gates_checked.pdf (accessed 6 August 2009). 
4 Gene Aloise, Nuclear Weapons: NNSA and DOD need to more effectively manage the stockpile life 
extension program,  Government Accountability Office Report 06-261 to the Subcommittee on Strategic 
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Natural Resources and Environment 
(Washington: Government Accountability Office, 2009), 1. 
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since 1992, mainly because the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Defense have 
certified the safety and reliability of all nine types of U.S. nuclear warheads every year 
since 1996.5  These certifications have been based largely on the results of the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program. 
At some point in the future, however, the aging warheads could become unsafe or 
unreliable due to the decaying nature of the materials of which they are made.  If the 
United States then wished to remain a nuclear power beyond that time period, it would be 
forced either to replace its stockpile with untested designs or to withdraw from the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in order to conduct nuclear explosive tests.  Either 
choice would be likely to draw international criticism. 
The Department of Defense would have to deal with the ramifications of the 
CTBT’s ratification or entry into force or simply a continuation of the test moratorium.  
The deterioration of legacy nuclear weapons could have increasingly significant 
consequences in terms of safety, reliability, and budgetary costs.  Strategic planners must 
also contend with a continuing decline in the overall number of deployable nuclear 
weapons due to international treaties, such as the projected new Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty with Russia.  At some point in time, a loss of confidence or capability 
in nuclear forces may necessitate doctrinal changes in the guidance to the United States 
Strategic Command. 
A build-up of conventional force capabilities might be required to preserve 
strategic deterrence in the absence of a credible nuclear threat.  The Air Force and Navy 
would also need to continuously reassess their capabilities to destroy strategic targets.  
More redundant targeting of high-value targets might be required based on lower 
probabilities of kill by less reliable nuclear weapons, thereby reducing the overall 
effectiveness of U.S. strategic forces.  Old warheads could also present a growing safety 
hazard to personnel that work on or near them. 
 
5 Jonathan Medalia, Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Congressional 
Research Service Report for Congress, IB92099 (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 22 March 
2006), 10. 
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The United States may eventually decide to replace its aging nuclear arsenal with 
newer, untested warheads to maintain its strategic posture.  Any new systems would be 
accompanied by changes in operations, force structures, budgets, safety procedures and 
security requirements.  An interim mix of untested warhead designs and aging legacy 
systems could also bring its own set of challenges. 
An additional problem the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would present to the 
United States is verification.  The entry into force of the treaty would immediately 
subject the United States to international verification regimes.  The Department of 
Defense would therefore have to plan for the possibility of on-site inspections on or near 
any of its installations with less than one week’s notice.  For example, Nellis Air Force 
Base could be inspected or over flown as part of an on-site inspection at the Department 
of Energy’s Nevada Test Site. 
This thesis investigates the hypothesis that there have been no significant new 
developments in the debate about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty since the United 
States Senate rejected it in 1999.  The thesis reviews the arguments presented by 
proponents and opponents in 1999 and strives to identify new and revised arguments in 
the current debate. 
D. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The concept of restricting nuclear testing has a long and storied history.  
Prominent scientists in the early years of the United States’ nuclear programs, including 
Albert Einstein, Enrico Fermi and Robert Oppenheimer, expressed concern over the 
future consequences of nuclear testing.6  Nevertheless, the Cold War led to a nuclear 
arms race, during which hundreds of hydrogen bomb tests were conducted by the United 





6 Herbert F. York, The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb (San Francisco: W.H. 
Freeman and Company, 1976), 64. 
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and spurred worldwide protests, which ultimately led to the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 
1963.7  The Limited Test Ban Treaty banned nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, outer 
space, and water, but permitted underground weapons testing. 
The Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty were 
negotiated in the 1970s to further limit underground nuclear weapons testing and non-
weapons related testing.  The two treaties were both ratified in 1990 and continue to limit 
underground explosive testing to 150 kilotons (approximately ten times the force of the 
Hiroshima explosion).8  The Hatfield amendment to the 1993 Energy and Water 
Appropriations Bill banned future United States nuclear testing of any yield unless 
another state tested nuclear explosives.  The United States has not conducted any nuclear 
explosive tests since 1992, despite several subsequent tests by China, France, India, 
North Korea, and Pakistan. 
The Hatfield amendment also required the President to work towards achieving a 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty no later than 1996.  International negotiations on a 
comprehensive nuclear test ban had resumed in the late 1970s between the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States, but never gained 
significant momentum among the nuclear weapon states until after the end of the Cold 
War.9  The 1996 treaty’s provisions ban nuclear explosions of any kind and create a 
technical secretariat to conduct on-site inspections and verify compliance through the 
International Monitoring System.10  Article I of the CTBT contains the basic obligations 
of the treaty: 
1.  Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test 
explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any 
such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control. 
 
7 Medalia, Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1. 
8 Ibid. 
9  Keith A. Hansen, The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: An Insider's Perspective (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 7–8. 
10 Medalia, Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 7. 
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2.  Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, 
encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any 
nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.11 
Entry into force requires signatures and ratifications from all forty-four states that 
possessed nuclear technology in 1996, referred to as "Annex 2 states" by the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization.12  (Instruments of ratification are not 
required from non-Annex 2 states in order for the CTBT to enter into force.)  Table 1 lists 
all states that have not ratified the CTBT as of November 2009, according to Annex 2 
and signatory status. 
 
STATUS LIST OF STATES 
Annex 2 (nuclear) states that 
have not signed  
India, North Korea, Pakistan 
Annex 2 (nuclear) states that 
have signed, but not ratified 
China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, United States 
Non-Annex 2 states that have 
not signed  
Bhutan, Cuba, Dominica, Mauritius, Niue, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, 
Syria, Tonga, Tuvalu 
Non-Annex 2 states that have 
signed, but not ratified 
Angola, Brunei Darussalam, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Comoros, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Marshall Islands, Myanmar, Nepal, 
Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Sri 
Lanka, Swaziland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Yemen, Zimbabwe 
 
Table 1.   States That Have Not Ratified the CTBT.13 
                                                 
11 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization Web site, The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 24 
September 1996, available at http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/treaty_text/ (accessed 25 October 2009). 
12 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization Web site, "Status of signature and ratification," 23 
September 2009, available at http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/status-of-signature-and-ratification/ (accessed 
16 October 2009). 
13 Ibid. 
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President William Clinton was the first national leader to sign the treaty in 1996, 
but the United States Senate rejected its ratification in 1999.14  The George W. Bush 
administration did not support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and thus did not 
resubmit it to the Senate despite significant international pressures.  President Obama’s 
recent speeches, notably his speech in April 2009 in Prague, indicate his desire to ratify 
the treaty and to convince the other eight Annex 2 states, whose ratification is required 
for the treaty's entry into force, to do so as well.15 
In light of the President’s intention to resubmit the treaty, the United States Senate 
is likely to engage in another round of debate regarding the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty.  This treaty has traditionally divided politicians and constituents alike.  Some 
adamantly support the treaty; others are vehemently against it; and still others struggle 
with its pros and cons.  The following discussion highlights some of the most prominent 
works of three types of literature in the CTBT debate. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The 1999 hearings in the U.S. Senate generated much of the discussion regarding 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and many reports, articles, and speeches have been 
written on the topic since that time.  These include works of analysis by scholars 
assessing the issues, works of advocacy for and against U.S. ratification of the treaty, and 
compromise reports written by groups unable to reach a consensus, but nonetheless 







14 Jonathan Medalia, Nuclear Testing and Comprehensive Test Ban: Chronology Starting September 
1992, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 97-1007F, (Washington: Congressional 
Research Service, 9 June 2005), 3–4. 
15 Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague, Czech Republic," 5 April 2009, 
available at http://whitehouse.gove/the_press_office/ (accessed 10 June 2009). 
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The Government Accountability Office and the Congressional Research Service 
have prepared several objective scholarly analyses regarding the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty.  The Government Accountability Office has reported on the annual 
assessment of the safety, probable performance, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear 
stockpile. The Congressional Research Service reports have provided background 
information on current developments regarding the CTBT, the issues raised by the treaty, 
and updated safeguards and net assessments. 
The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and several prominent 
scientists provided testimony in support of ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
to the United States Senate in 1999.  Nuclear arms control advocates view the treaty as an 
important part of nuclear non-proliferation regimes and a significant step toward global 
nuclear disarmament.16  Many technical experts believe that the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program can ensure long-term safety and reliability for U.S. nuclear weapons.17  
Proponents of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty also argue that the international 
monitoring system is sufficient to detect any nuclear explosive testing of interest.18 
Opponents of U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty question (a) 
the ability of the international monitoring system to detect all relevant nuclear tests, and 
(b) the resolve of the United Nations Security Council to punish those that conduct 
nuclear tests.  Opponents are also skeptical regarding the ability of the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program to preserve a safe and reliable nuclear force.  The New Deterrent 
Working Group’s 2009 report stated that aging nuclear warheads will eventually erode 
the credibility of the U.S. strategic posture and that “a weak American nuclear posture in 
fact encourages proliferation more than a strong one.”19 
 
16 George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Samuel A. Nunn, "A World Free of 
Nuclear Weapons," The Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007: A15. 
17 Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, John P. Holdren, Chairman, 
National Academy of Sciences (Washington: National Academy Press, 2002), 34. 
18 Ibid., 57–59. 
19 The New Deterrent Working Group, U.S. Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century (Washington: 
Center for Security Policy Press, July 2009), 29. 
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There is also at least one commission whose members were unable to reach a 
consensus regarding the advisability of U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty.  The Congressional Commission on America’s Strategic Posture was split in its 
assessment of the treaty’s value to the United States; but nonetheless, attempted to 
provide constructive conclusions and useful recommendations in its 2009 report.  This 
report demonstrates how contentious the CTBT ratification question could be in 
upcoming debates and outlines the importance of diplomatic safeguards and net 
assessments.20 
F. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis compares the U.S. debate on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 
1999 with the arguments advanced today.  Proponents and opponents of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty brought forth several arguments concerning the treaty in 
the years leading up to its ultimate rejection by the U.S. Senate in 1999.  These 
arguments are compared with various current perspectives to determine whether any 
significant changes in the CTBT debate have emerged in the intervening decade.  
Historical testimonies and speeches from senior officials in the Department of Defense, 
the Department of Energy and the national laboratories since the end of the Cold War 
serve as primary sources of information.  Other primary sources include works of 
analysis and advocacy concerning the implications for U.S. national security of CTBT 
ratification, as discussed in the literature review. 
G. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter II discusses the arguments advanced 
by CTBT proponents during the October 1999 hearings in the United States Senate.  
Chapter III outlines the arguments advanced by opponents of the treaty during the same 
hearings.  Chapter IV compares data collected from recent articles, speeches, and reports 
with the arguments presented in 1999 to assess the extent to which new information or 
 
20 America's Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic 
Posture of the United States, William J. Perry, Chairman, James R. Schlesinger, Vice-Chairman 
(Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 87. 
 11
arguments have emerged.  Chapter V examines the current composition of the United 
States Senate and the potential political dynamics of the prospective CTBT debate, 
including the possibility of using treaty safeguards as a bargaining instrument among 
senators.  Finally, this thesis concludes that technical advancements since 1999 in the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program and the International Monitoring System have bolstered 
supporting arguments in favor of U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty.  
The decision by the Senate to provide its advice and consent to the CTBT, however, 
remains difficult to predict due to lingering doubts about the treaty's contribution to non-
proliferation efforts, the ability and resolve of the United Nations to enforce compliance 
with its provisions, and the long-term effects it might have on the credibility of the U.S. 
nuclear deterrence posture. 
 12
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II. PROPONENTS OF THE CTBT 
A. OPENING ARGUMENTS 
Senator Joseph Biden provided opening remarks for proponents of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty during the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings 
in October 1999.  He drew parallels to the debate, that took place in the Senate prior to 
the ratification of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, citing similar concerns about the 
ability to maintain a strong U.S. nuclear deterrent, the difficulties in verifying compliance 
with the treaty, the possibility of another state gaining an unfair advantage by “cheating,” 
and the question of the effects of the U.S. decision on worldwide nuclear proliferation.21 
The story since 1963 is one in which those whom I would call the 
“realistic optimists” were proved right and the “visceral pessimists” did 
not see their fears realized.  Our deterrent posture did not suffer, even 
though we gave up tests that surely gave us more confidence in our 
weapons than we could gain through underground tests alone.  We gained 
worldwide respect for reining in the nuclear arms race, which five years 
later translated into U.S. diplomatic success in negotiating the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and the treaty banning nuclear weapons in Latin 
America––treaties that have succeeded in constraining nuclear 
proliferation.22 
The opening statement by Senator Biden underscored the opinion held by many 
proponents that ratification of the CTBT by the United States would strengthen 
worldwide nuclear non-proliferation efforts. 
Members of the Clinton administration provided testimony along with several 
prominent scientists in support of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.  Their testimonies 




21 Senator Joseph R. Biden, Prepared Testimony of Joseph R. Biden before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, United States Senate, 7 October 1999 (Washington: Federal News Service, 1999). 
22 Ibid. 
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1.  U.S. ratification of the CTBT would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. 
2.  The U.S. nuclear deterrent could remain safe and reliable under the CTBT. 
3.  The CTBT would be effectively verifiable. 
This chapter describes these three arguments in detail. 
B. NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
The unilateral moratorium on U.S. nuclear testing had been in effect for over 
seven years in 1999, and the Clinton administration had no plans to conduct any future 
tests.  Therefore, the United States had already subjected itself to the major drawbacks of 
the treaty without obtaining any benefits the treaty might provide.  Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright asked, “What exactly would we be risking?  With no treaty, other 
countries can test without cheating, and without limit.”23  Secretary Albright also 
maintained that the CTBT would have a positive effect on non-proliferation efforts. 
The Treaty removes a key tool that a modernizer or a proliferator would 
need to develop with confidence small, advanced nuclear warheads.  
These are the weapons that can most readily be concealed; and that can be 
delivered by ballistic missiles.  They are the most threatening to others and 
to us…. It is potential proliferators who need to test; we do not.  By 
approving the CTBT, we can go far to lock in a technological status quo 
that protects us without threatening others.24  
Secretary Albright's statement indicated that proponents of the CTBT viewed the treaty 
as a way to put a cap on advanced nuclear weapons technologies.  This would have 
permanently kept the United States as the most advanced nuclear state, assuming that 
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Secretary of Defense William Cohen and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, General Henry Shelton, agreed with the Secretary of State that the treaty would 
serve the national security interests of the United States by combating the spread of 
nuclear weapons.  In his prepared testimony, Secretary Cohen made the following 
statement: 
I must note that [the] CTBT would promote U.S. non-proliferation efforts.  
Strengthening international norms against the spread of nuclear weapons, 
to the extent they can help prevent new nuclear weapons states from 
emerging, is critically important to our national security…. The CTBT 
thus is an important element of a mutually reinforcing set of tools to 
prevent and counter proliferation, which also includes the NPT, MTCR 
[Missile Technology Control Regime], the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Program, targeted and effective export controls, and diplomatic efforts and 
military programs to counter and defend against WMD [Weapons of Mass 
Destruction] and their means of delivery.25 
Secretary Cohen and General Shelton each supported Senator Biden's argument that the 
CTBT would add an important element to other successful measures in the nuclear non-
proliferation regime. 
Advocates of U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty argued that 
the treaty’s entry into force would have several long-term and immediate positive effects 
on international security.  They pointed out that U.S. political credibility was at stake 
because the United States had agreed to stop testing as part of the 1995 negotiations that 
indefinitely extended the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.26 
Key U.S. representatives in the negotiations that produced the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty agreed that other states viewed U.S. participation in the treaty as crucial 
to larger non-proliferation efforts.  Many believed that rejection of the CTBT by the 
United States Senate would send a negative message to both friends and foes of the 
United States.  Other states would continue to use the United States as an excuse for their 
 
25 U.S. Departement of Defense, Testimony of William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense and General 
Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Departement of Defense, before the 
Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 6 October 1999 (Washington: Federal News Service, 
1999). 
26 Jonathan Medalia, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Pro and Con, Congressional Research Service 
Report for Congress, RS20351 (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 28 June 2005), 2. 
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own reluctance to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.27 Ambassador 
Stephen Ledogar, the chief U.S. negotiator of the CTBT from 1993 to 1996, expressed 
the following concern if the Senate rejected the treaty: 
I believe it is not an exaggeration to say that there will be jubilation among 
our foes and despair among our friends.  Iran, Iraq, North Korea and other 
states that harbor nuclear aspirations surely will feel the constraints 
loosening.  Our allies and friends will feel deserted and betrayed.  The 
global nuclear non-proliferation regime will be endangered.28 
Ambassador Ledogar's statement indicated that, without U.S. ratification of the CTBT, 
other previously successful non-proliferation measures might fail. 
Proponents of the CTBT pointed to past successes in international arms control as 
a reason for prompt U.S. ratification.  They contended that other states would follow the 
lead of the United States if it were to ratify the treaty and offered the Chemical Weapons 
Convention as a successful example.  Secretary Albright said, "Once we decided to move 
ahead, five countries, including China, chose to submit their ratifications on the same day 
we did.  Cuba ratified a week later, and Iran, Pakistan and Russia followed within eight 
months."29 
Secretary Cohen testified, "The United States does not depend upon nuclear 
weapons to the same degree as it did during the Cold War."30  He added another 
dimension to the non-proliferation argument by pointing out the unequalled conventional 
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29 U.S. Department of State, Testimony of Madeleine K. Albright, 7 October 1999. 
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At the same time that nuclear competition with another superpower 
subsided, the threat has grown of rogue and other countries seeking 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear weapons, a means 
to offset our overwhelming conventional superiority or because of 
regional rivalries.31 
Although he did not make this point explicitly, Secretary Cohen’s comment could have 
implied that international treaties to limit nuclear capabilities could give the United States 
an increased advantage over other nuclear weapon states because of its conventional 
superiority. 
C. CREDIBILITY OF U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 
Others argued that the CTBT would also preserve the U.S. advantage in nuclear 
weapons technology by limiting the test options of others.  The United States had 
conducted 1,032 of the total 2,052 nuclear tests conducted worldwide and had gained the 
most experience from testing.32  Representatives of the Department of Energy, including 
Secretary Bill Richardson, testified that the Stockpile Stewardship Program could ensure 
the long-term safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile and that the United States 
would gain little from renewed nuclear testing.33  Sidney Drell, a founding member of 
the JASON Defense Advisory Group, provided the following testimony to the Senat
The detailed analyses that I have been involved in, or led, with expert 
colleagues, including several of our leading weapons designers, lead me to 
conclude quite strongly that underground nuclear explosions have little to 
contribute and nothing essential, relative to what we are presently learning 
from the stewardship program.34 
Drell and Secretary Richardson viewed the Stockpile Stewardship Program as an 
effective replacement for underground nuclear testing. 
 
31 U.S. Department of Defense, Testimony of William S. Cohen, 7 October 1999. 
32 Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, "Nuclear Testing 1945-2009," 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, available at http://www.ctbto.org (accessed 9 July 2009). 
33 U.S. Department of Energy, Testimony of Bill Richardson, Secretary of Energy, before the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 7 October 1999 (Washington: Federal News 
Service, 1999). 
34 Sidney D. Drell, Testimony of Sidney D. Drell before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United 
States Senate, 7 October 1999 (Washington: Federal News Service, 1999). 
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Richard Garwin, a Senior Fellow from the Council on Foreign Relations and a 
member of the JASON group, stated that the Stockpile Stewardship Program could 
remedy all deficiencies in the U.S. nuclear stockpile without tests involving critical 
nuclear explosions.35  He conceded that primary and secondary explosives would 
eventually age and require remanufacture, but argued that the CTBT would have no 
effect on their reliability. 
[I]f they are remanufactured to the same specifications as they were 
initially produced, they will be as good as the day they were first made.  
This can be done any number of times, and is the basis for my confidence 
in the future stockpile…. We need to have not only the assessment but the 
remanufacturing facility; the need for that facility has nothing to do with 
the CTBT.36 
In Garwin's estimation, U.S. ratification of the CTBT would not have any detrimental 
effects on the U.S. nuclear stockpile.  He insisted that the nuclear industrial complex 
must be maintained regardless of the status of the CTBT. 
D. VERIFICATION 
Other states could substantially benefit from renewed testing, so verification of 
compliance with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was a central issue in the debate.  
Proponents of the treaty admitted that states conducting nuclear tests could conceivably 
evade detection by the International Monitoring System and National Technical Means, 
but declared that such tests would be difficult to accomplish and would provide minimal 
benefits.  Secretary of Defense Cohen made the following statement in regard to 
verification: 
CTBT evasion is not easy, it would require significant efforts in terms of 
expertise, preparations, and resources.  In the end, the testing party has no 
guarantees that its preparations or its nuclear test will escape detection, 
and possible on-site inspection, despite its best efforts.  In addition, 
detection capability varies according to the location of the clandestine test 
and the evasion measures employed; a potential evader may not 
 
35 Richard L. Garwin, Testimony of Richard L. Garwin before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
United States Senate, 7 October 1999 (Washington: Federal News Service, 1999). 
36 Ibid. 
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understand the full U.S. monitoring capability, thus adding to his 
uncertainty.  Further, detection of a nuclear explosion conducted in 
violation of the CTBT would be a very serious matter with significant 
political consequences.37 
Secretary Cohen acknowledged that clandestine nuclear testing could take place under 
the CTBT, but expressed the judgment that states would not have an adequate incentive 
to do so.  It would be difficult for others to calculate the risk of being caught; there would 
be significant political consequences if cheating was detected, and clandestine tests 
would probably not produce sizable gains in nuclear weapons technology. 
E. SUMMARY 
Proponents of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty presented three main 
arguments, while seeking the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate.  They argued that 
the treaty was an opportunity for the United States to show its leadership and good faith 
in meeting its NPT Article VI commitment to work toward nuclear disarmament while 
bolstering worldwide efforts to curb the threat of nuclear proliferation.  At the same time, 
they testified to the adequacy of the Stockpile Stewardship Program to protect the nuclear 
deterrence posture of the United States and to the adequacy of verification measures to 
ensure treaty compliance by others.  In the end, their efforts failed and the CTBT fell far 
short of the required two-thirds majority vote in the United States Senate. 
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III. OPPONENTS OF THE CTBT 
A. OPENING ARGUMENTS 
Opponents of U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty disagreed 
with its proponents on what issues were relevant to the decision and on the interpretation 
of the information presented during the Senate hearings in 1999.  Not surprisingly, 
opponents of the treaty addressed all of the same issues presented by their counterparts, 
but took an entirely different stance on each of them.  Their main arguments included the 
following three elements: 
1.  U.S. ratification of the CTBT would undermine the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. 
2.  The U.S. nuclear deterrent could not remain safe and reliable under the CTBT. 
3.  The CTBT would not be effectively verifiable and enforceable. 
Skeptics regarding the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty saw little to no value in ratifying 
it.  In their view, the primary health and environmental benefits of limitations on nuclear 
testing had been achieved by the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, which banned tests 
everywhere but underground.38  They also disputed the effectiveness of the International 
Monitoring System’s ability to detect clandestine tests as well as the resolve of the United 
Nations Security Council to punish those that conduct nuclear tests.  Opponents of the 
CTBT used the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as examples of failed international treaties.  
Kathleen Bailey, the first social scientist hired by Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory, articulated this view during her testimony to the Senate: 
Over the history of the NPT norm, the list of states which broke or are 
thought to have broken the norm include Argentina, Brazil, India, Iran, 
Iraq, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, and 
Taiwan.  North Korea is still in violation of the treaty and its norm, with 
 
38 Ronald F. Lehman, Testimony of Ronald F. Lehman before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
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no adverse consequences for its noncompliance.  It is also worth noting 
that the NPT is signed by virtually every country except Pakistan, India, 
and Israel.  The CTBT, therefore, would be a treaty in which nations 
promise not to test the weapons that they have already promised not to 
develop.  It is redundant…. Nations seek weapons based on their own 
security needs…. A nation whose leadership believes nuclear weapons are 
needed for security is not going to abandon the idea simply because the 
U.S. conducts or does not conduct nuclear tests.39 
Bailey's statement simultaneously disputed the success of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and questioned the relevance of the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty. 
B. PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
Kathleen Bailey summed up the position of many opposed to the ratification of 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.  While the treaty’s effects on nuclear non-
proliferation efforts were central to the arguments presented by its proponents, many 
remained skeptical about its value.  They questioned the effectiveness of this treaty and 
other treaties, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in 
containing the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons.  In fact, some argued 
that the CTBT would actually undermine non-proliferation efforts and give states more 
incentive to develop their own nuclear deterrents.  A loss of confidence in either the 
credibility of the U.S. nuclear stockpile or the resolve of the U.S. government to 
guarantee nuclear retaliation on behalf of its allies in response to any attacks using 
weapons of mass destruction, they argued, would increase domestic pressures within 
those states to procure their own nuclear deterrents.  James Schlesinger, a former Director 
of the Central Intelligence Agency, Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy, 
testified: 
This will particularly be the case, when and if confidence in the reliability 
and robustness of the U.S. deterrent wanes.  Some nations will rely less on 
the protections for non-nuclear weapon states implicit in the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and [will be] more inclined to depend on their own 
 
39 Kathleen C. Bailey, Testimony of Kathleen C. Bailey before the Committee on Armed Services, 
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resources.  To the extent that confidence in and thus credibility of the U.S. 
deterrent wanes, ironically and perhaps paradoxically, the CTBT could in 
the long run result in greater rather than less proliferation.40 
Schlesinger's statement articulated the position of many opposed to U.S. ratification of 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.  In their assessments, the CTBT would inevitably 
weaken U.S. nuclear deterrence.  This would, in turn, encourage nuclear proliferation 
because allies would no longer count on U.S. nuclear weapons to provide deterrence in 
their defense, and their adversaries would no longer fear U.S. nuclear retaliation. 
C. CREDIBILITY OF U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 
While the issue of non-proliferation was central to the arguments of the treaty’s 
proponents, the credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrence was the focal point for those 
skeptical of the CTBT.   Some testified that a lack of nuclear testing in the United States 
would undermine the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and that testing programs 
should be preserved.  They did not believe that the Stockpile Stewardship Program was a 
proven substitute for nuclear testing, nor could it ensure the long-term safety and 
reliability of the U.S. stockpile. 
The United States Department of Energy began development of the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program shortly after the moratorium on nuclear testing began and 
implemented its measures as a safeguard to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty under 
the Clinton administration in 1996.41  The program was, therefore, only three years old 
when the debate took place in the United States Senate and many felt that its merits 
should have been proven before the cessation of nuclear testing.  Robert B. Barker, the 
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy in the George H.W. Bush 
administration and a former Associate Director for Arms Control at the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory, provided the following testimony: 
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The Stockpile Stewardship program is not now and never will be––even 
ten years from now when its major components might be operational––a 
substitute for nuclear testing in the sense of giving us equal confidence in 
the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons. The U.S. abandoned the 
prudent approach when it ceased nuclear testing in 1992 without 
demonstrating a reliable substitute for nuclear tests.42 
John S. Foster, a former weapons designer and director of Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory, also cited historical evidence of how an international agreement to limit 
nuclear testing led to a simultaneous decrease in reliability and a false sense of 
confidence in the 1950s. 
Many of you recall the 1958 Gentleman’s Understanding on a moratorium 
on nuclear testing and the abrupt Soviet breaking of that understanding.  
President Kennedy, referring to the agreement said, "Once fooled, shame 
on them; twice fooled, shame on us."  During the three years of that 
moratorium we made great progress with our computer calculations and 
hydrodynamic experiments.  When the Soviets broke the moratorium and 
we also went back to testing, we found out how badly we had fooled 
ourselves.43 
The statements made by Barker and Foster indicated that several nuclear weapons experts 
were not convinced that the Stockpile Stewardship Program could ensure the long-term 
safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons. 
Another reason the CTBT would undermine the credibility of U.S. nuclear 
deterrence, its opponents argued, was that a lack of testing would have more adverse 
consequences on the U.S. stockpile than on the nuclear weapons of any other state.  They 
noted that the design complexities of U.S. nuclear warheads left little margin for error, 
and that they were never designed to last as long as they had been maintained in the 
stockpile.44  Normal radioactive decay and chemical decomposition could have 
unanticipated damaging effects on the safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear warheads. 
Meanwhile, other states had significantly different standards for reliability and less 
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sensitivity to margins and uncertainties.45  Robert Barker stated, “We should not assume 
that others will have the same need for testing that we have.  Other nations’ nuclear 
weapons will not decay at the same rate; every nation will not lose confidence in their 
nuclear weaponry at the same time.”46  Barker implied that the United States might lose 
confidence in its nuclear weapons after not testing them for some period of time, while 
other states might retain full confidence in their nuclear weapons.  This would result in a 
huge shift in the international balance of power if the United States lost its nuclear 
deterrent credibility prior to other nuclear-armed states. 
D. VERIFICATION 
Skeptics about the CTBT argued that the treaty was not verifiable and that, while 
the United States would faithfully comply with the treaty, other states would “cheat.”47  
They noted that previous treaties, such as the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Threshold 
Test Ban Treaty, were both ratified because each could be verified.48  According to all 
three U.S. weapons laboratories, testing at 500 tons of nuclear yield provides useful data, 
but testing between one and ten kilotons is required to become fully confident in the 
safety and reliability of any new designs.49  Kathleen Bailey provided the following 
testimony regarding evasive testing:  
A nation may conduct nuclear tests evasively, which would allow several 
kilotons to be tested with little or no risk of detection.  One method by 
which this might be done is through energy decoupling––detonation of the 
device in a cavity––that can reduce the signal by as much as a factor of 70.  
Thus, a kiloton explosion could be made to look seismically like a 14-ton 
explosion fully coupled.  A 10-kiloton explosion could look like a .14-
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System] will not be able to detect nuclear testing below one kiloton and, if 
the test is evasively conducted, will not detect several kilotons.  
Supplemental data from U.S. national technical means will not fill the 
gap.50 
Bailey's statement demonstrated that many doubted the International Monitoring System's 
ability to detect clandestine nuclear testing by those determined to advance their 
command of nuclear weapons technology.  Energy decoupling provided a plausible 
method to evade detection and, therefore, the political consequences of illegal nuclear 
testing. 
E. SUMMARY 
Opponents of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty argued that the treaty was 
unverifiable and would undermine the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, which 
could then lead to more nuclear proliferation and international instability.  Their 
arguments in 1999 were sufficient for the majority of U.S. senators to vote against 
providing their advice and consent to the CTBT.  (The vote was 48 to 51.) 
Many of the arguments presented during the 1999 U.S. Senate hearings have 
endured.  Most who continue to oppose ratification of the CTBT do so because they 
believe that it will weaken U.S. nuclear deterrence and lead to international instability, 
including possible proliferation of nuclear weapons.  They have little confidence in the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program, the International Monitoring System, and the United 
Nations Security Council's willingness to enforce treaty compliance.  They also doubt 
that the CTBT would make any valuable contribution to the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. 
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IV. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1999 
A. AFTERMATH OF THE SENATE REJECTION 
The Clinton administration quickly established a commission to address the 
concerns that had led to the U.S. Senate's rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty.  Retired General and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John 
Shalikashvili led the commission and released a report in January 2001.  This report 
provided recommendations to achieve bipartisan support for the CTBT by addressing 
concerns over whether the CTBT had genuine non-proliferation value, whether cheating 
could threaten U.S. security, whether the U.S. nuclear deterrent could remain safe and 
reliable without nuclear testing, and whether it was wise to endorse a treaty of indefinite 
duration.51 
Several of General Shalikashvili’s recommendations were adopted by the George 
W. Bush administration despite its continued opposition to the CTBT.  President Bush 
continued the moratorium on nuclear testing and the United States continued to 
contribute money to the construction and establishment of the International Monitoring 
System.  Increased funding was also given to the Stockpile Stewardship Program.  The 
Nuclear Weapons Council provides annual reports on the safety and reliability of the U.S. 
nuclear stockpile to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, who are now 
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The Bush administration did not appoint a Deputy National Security Advisor for 
Non-Proliferation, as called for in the Shalikashvili report.53  National Security 
Presidential Directive 17 (NSPD-17), however, called for the strengthening of 
multilateral regimes, including the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).54  This document made no 
reference to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as any part of the administration’s non-
proliferation strategy.  
B. GEOPOLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
1. China and Russia 
China and Russia have continued to modernize their nuclear weapons systems 
since 1999.  China is believed to be the only one of the five NPT-recognized nuclear 
weapons states to have increased the size of its nuclear arsenal since the end of the Cold 
War.  China is now estimated to have approximately 400 nuclear weapons in its 
possession.55  According to Christopher Ford, a former Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State and Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation during the 
George W. Bush administration: 
China is today the sole country among the five NPT nuclear weapons 
states to be actually increasing the size of its nuclear arsenal.  It is also one 
of four NPT nuclear weapons states that is modernizing its strategic 
nuclear delivery systems.  This build-up is usually described as "slow," 
but according to Pentagon estimates China has actually increased the size 
of its arsenal by about 25 percent since 2005 alone.  Beijing's qualitative 
and quantitative improvements include new road-mobile intercontinental 
ballistic missiles and a new submarine that will fire equally new 
missiles.56 
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Modernization programs in China and Russia lend credibility to the arguments made by 
skeptics regarding the CTBT in 1999.  China has qualitatively and quantitatively 
improved its nuclear forces despite its nuclear test moratorium, while the U.S. nuclear 
stockpile has continued to decline. 
Russia has also modernized some of its nuclear forces, while continuing to reduce 
the overall numbers of deployed nuclear weapons in accordance with bilateral 
agreements with the United States.  Since 1999, Russia has worked on developing the 
Sineva and Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missiles and a mobile-launched variant 
of the Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile.57  Officially, the last Russian nuclear 
weapons test occurred on 24 October 1990 and the Russian Federation ratified the CTBT 
on 30 June 2000.58  Some contend that the Russians, however, and possibly the Chinese 
have concealed low-yield nuclear tests as part of their modernization programs, contrary 
to their own test moratoriums and the CTBT signed by both states in 1996.59  According 
to the 2009 Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the 
United States, "Apparently, Russia and possibly China are conducting low-yield tests.  
This is quite serious because Russian and Chinese doctrine highlights tactical nuclear 
warfighting." 
Christopher Ford found this allegation surprising only in that the commission 
publicly acknowledged Russian low-yield nuclear testing, instead of keeping it classified.  
He postulated, "If this is true, and if such activity has been known or suspected for some 
time, then the 1999 Senate rejection of the CTBT might also have reflected concerns 
about the prospect of Russian CTBT violations undetected by the treaty's monitoring 
system."60  Ford also made the following observations during a 2009 speech: 
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Russia seems to have become increasingly committed to nuclear 
weaponry.... Russia has, in the words of its own officials, "lower[ed] the 
threshold for using nuclear weapons" and "extend[ed] the nuclear deterrent 
to smaller conflicts."  Russia is also modernizing its strategic delivery 
systems, deploying new mobile missiles, working on a new generation of 
ballistic missile submarine with a new missile and warhead, and 
developing an entirely new "hypersonic glide vehicle" launched from a 
ballistic missile.  Nor has modernization work stopped with delivery 
systems:  Moscow is developing new types of nuclear weapons, 
apparently in part by using secret low yield nuclear explosive tests 
notwithstanding Russia's claimed testing moratorium.61 
Russia rejects allegations that it has engaged in low-yield testing, however, and claims 
that it develops its new delivery systems and maintains its warheads without nuclear 
testing.  In July 2009, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said, "Under the global ban 
on nuclear tests, we can only use computer-assisted simulations to ensure the reliability 
of Russia's nuclear deterrent."62  The alleged low-yield nuclear testing by Russia is 
important for two reasons.  First, clandestine testing would invalidate the claims that the 
International Monitoring System would be effective and thus call into question the 
verifiability of the CTBT.  Second, if Russia has indeed conducted low-yield nuclear 
testing in violation of its own moratorium, it would prove that other states could violate 
the CTBT and improve their nuclear weapons without political repercussions.  
2. India and Pakistan 
Neither India nor Pakistan has conducted any known nuclear weapons testing 
since 1998, but each maintains a modest nuclear arsenal.  Indian leaders have remained 
unapologetic about their refusal to sign the NPT or the CTBT.  India's External Affairs 
Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, recently said, "We will not sign the CTBT."63  India did, 
however, sign the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Initiative in 2005.  This 
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agreement separates India's civilian power industry from its military nuclear programs 
and subjects the former to safeguard protocols under the IAEA.  According to a joint 
U.S.-Indian statement, 
These responsibilities and practices consist of: identifying and separating 
civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner, 
and filing a declaration regarding its civilian facilities with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); taking a decision to place 
voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; signing 
and adhering to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear 
facilities; continuing India's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing; 
working with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile 
Material Cut Off Treaty; refraining from transfer of enrichment and 
reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and supporting 
international efforts to limit their spread; and ensuring that the necessary 
steps have been taken to secure nuclear materials and technology through 
comprehensive export control legislation and through harmonization and 
adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines.64 
India has proven that it is willing to work with international institutions, including the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, but it has shown no interest in signing the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
Pakistan often links its nuclear weapons program to that of India and maintains 
that its estimated 60 nuclear warheads are necessary for deterrence against attacks by 
WMD and/or a much larger Indian conventional military.65  A border skirmish between 
India and Pakistan, known as the Kargil Conflict, killed hundreds of soldiers from each 
side between May and July of 1999 and fueled fears of a potential nuclear war between 
the two states.66  The resulting peace agreement between the two states was controversial 
in Pakistan and led to a military coup, which ousted Pakistan's democratically elected 
government on 12 October 1999, just one day prior to the CTBT vote in the U.S. 
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Senate.67  Some analysts have viewed Pakistan's nuclear stockpile as a potential source 
of nuclear weapons for terrorists because of the continuing political and social turmoil 
and the violent extremist organizations that operate within its borders.  Perhaps the most 
significant nuclear proliferation-related development involving Pakistan since 1999 was 
the public revelation in 2004 that Pakistani nuclear entrepreneur Abdul Qadeer Khan and 
his associates had exported nuclear weapons-related technologies to Iran, Libya, North 
Korea and perhaps others.68 
3. Iran 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also investigated Iran in 2003 
for having concealed nuclear-related activities.  Undeclared nuclear facilities at Natanz 
and Arak were found to be conducting illicit nuclear activities, including the importation 
of uranium compounds, plutonium separation experiments, and uranium enrichment and 
conversion experiments, all of which violated Iran's safeguards agreement with the 
IAEA.69  Iran temporarily suspended most of these activities, but resumed uranium 
enrichment and conversion in 2005.  Discussions between Iran and various international 
organizations, including the IAEA and the United Nations, have yielded mixed results, 
but the latest report from the IAEA indicates that Iran has continued to defy the United 
Nations Security Council's demands by continuing its uranium enrichment and heavy-
water reactor programs.70  In addition to these violations, President Barack Obama 
revealed an additional clandestine nuclear facility near Qom, Iran, on 25 September 2009: 
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The existence of this facility underscores Iran's continuing unwillingness 
to meet its obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions and IAEA 
requirements. Iran's decision to build yet another nuclear facility without 
notifying the IAEA represents a direct challenge to the basic compact at 
the center of the non-proliferation regime.71 
Whether Iran intends to build nuclear weapons is currently subject to debate in the 
international community.  Intelligence agencies and international inspectors are 
concerned that Iran could have sufficient enriched uranium, a missile (the Shahab 3) 
capable of reaching Israel and parts of Europe, and a warhead small enough to fit on the 
Shahab 3.72  If Iran did arm itself with nuclear weapons, it would immediately create 
security dilemmas in Europe and the Middle East; and this could lead to further nuclear 
proliferation. 
4. North Korea 
North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and conducted an underground test 
of a nuclear weapon on 9 October 2006.  The United Nations Security Council responded 
with Resolution 1718, imposing economic sanctions on North Korea.73  Six party talks 
involving China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States have 
been conducted intermittently since 2003 in an attempt to curb North Korea's nuclear 
weapons aspirations.  North Korea boycotted the six party negotiations twice between 
2004 and 2007, but eventually signed agreements to disable fissile material production 
capabilities at its Yongbyon facilities in exchange for economic aid and reduced 
sanctions.74  In April 2009, however, North Korea launched a Taepodong II test missile 
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over Japan, terminated its participation in the six party talks, and expelled U.S. and IAEA 
personnel at Yongbyon.75  North Korea announced soon after that it had conducted a 
second underground test of nuclear weapons on 25 May 2009.76 
Recent events indicate that North Korea might soon return to the six party 
negotiations, but the prospects of its nuclear disarmament are uncertain.  Some contend 
that the current leadership in Pyongyang merely uses negotiations as a stalling tactic.  
Henry Kissinger remarked that, 
At the end of a negotiation, North Korea will either destroy its nuclear 
arsenal, or it will become a de facto nuclear state.  So far, it has used the 
negotiating forums available to it in a skillful campaign of procrastination, 
alternating leaps in technological progress with negotiating phases to 
consolidate it.  We seem to be approaching such a consolidation phase 
now.  North Korea may return to its well-established tactic of diverting us 
with the prospect of imminent breakthroughs.  This is exactly what 
happened after the last Korean nuclear weapons test in 2006.  Pyongyang 
undoubtedly will continue to seek to achieve de facto acceptance as a 
nuclear weapons state by endlessly protracted diplomacy.... Any outcome 
other than the elimination of the North Korean nuclear military capability 
in a fixed time period is a blow to non-proliferation prospects worldwide 
and to peace and stability globally.77 
If Kissinger is correct in his assessment of North Korea, there is no reason to believe that 
it will abandon its nuclear weapons program and dismantle its current stockpile to rejoin 
the NPT.  North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT undermined the entire nuclear non-
proliferation regime and significantly reduced the probability of the CTBT's entry into 
force. 
5. Interpretations of Geopolitical Developments 
These developments in the geopolitical environment since 1999 can be interpreted 
in different ways, depending on one's perspective.  Both sides of the CTBT debate agree 
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that nuclear proliferation is a serious threat to U.S. national security, but the two sides 
disagree on the status of the non-proliferation regime in light of current events. 
Opponents of the treaty point to nuclear force modernization programs and 
possible low-yield testing programs in China and Russia as proof that the CTBT is vague 
and unverifiable.78  Comments by Indian and Pakistani leaders also lead some analysts to 
believe that the treaty will not enter into force any time soon even if the United States 
does ratify it.  Therefore, by this logic, there would be no point in subjecting the United 
States to the restrictions of the CTBT while others could ignore them. 
To skeptics regarding the CTBT, Iran and North Korea epitomize the reasons why 
the treaty will be of no benefit to U.S. national security.  The New Deterrent Working 
Group stated that 
The accelerating proliferation of nuclear weapons technology in places 
like Pakistan, North Korea, Iran and Syria is an indictment of the effort to 
prevent such a danger via arms control.  The global non-proliferation 
regime has been steadily declining for many years, and it has now reached 
the point of impotence.79 
Each of these states has successfully concealed significant portions of its nuclear 
programs, while international treaties and United Nations Security Council actions have 
not provided effective measures against nuclear proliferation.  Mohamed ElBaradei, 
Director General of the IAEA from 1 December 1997 through 30 November 2009, 
publicly acknowledged his agency's inability to investigate clandestine nuclear activities 
in some states: 
In over 90 states, the Agency either has no verification authority at all, or 
its authority is inadequate, because these countries have not concluded the 
necessary agreements with the Agency.  That means we often cannot 
verify whether a country is engaged in clandestine nuclear activities.80 
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The IAEA's continued inability to investigate clandestine nuclear activities provides 
evidence supporting the argument that the CTBT is unverifiable.  Weak support for the 
IAEA from the United Nations Security Council leads many to conclude that states 
conducting illicit nuclear testing would not receive proper punishment even if the CTBT 
entered into force. 
Proponents of the CTBT, in contrast, hold that the NPT has been successful in 
curbing nuclear proliferation among all states minus the few noted exceptions.  They 
argue that early entry into force of the CTBT is urgent to freeze the technological 
capabilities of established nuclear weapon states and to contain proliferation threats such 
as Iran and North Korea.  They are also optimistic that other states will move toward 
ratification if the United States ratifies the treaty.  In fact, Indonesia has already pledged 
to do so.81  Deepti Choubey, deputy director of the non-proliferation program at the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, wrote: 
Proliferation threats like Iran make U.S. ratification more urgent and a 
smart global security strategy.  After the U.S. and China ratify, the major 
powers will have another tool for impeding Iran's nuclear ambitions.  
Because China's ratification is linked to the timing of U.S. ratification, the 
United States must act first.... By legally committing itself to the global 
norm against nuclear tests, Iran could reduce concerns about its nuclear 
program.  Not doing so increases the skepticism from countries that until 
now have kept an open mind about Iran's "nuclear file."  The U.S. would 
be in a stronger position to make this demand and to translate that 
skepticism into support for other enforcement measures if it ratifies first 
and soon.82 
Choubey's argument is that U.S. ratification of the CTBT could provide momentum for 
others to follow.  This could further isolate the remaining holdouts and put increased 
international pressure on them to cooperate with non-proliferation regimes. 
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C. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARGUMENT FOR RATIFICATION 
Some nuclear arms control advocates continue to view the CTBT as an important 
part of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and a significant step toward global nuclear 
disarmament.  Proponents of the CTBT assert that further delays in U.S. ratification could 
call into question the U.S. commitment to upholding the political agreements associated 
with the 1995 indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT).  Many believe that continued support of the non-proliferation regime by 
some nonnuclear states is dependent on the willingness of nuclear-armed states to work 
towards disarmament.83  This argument stems from Article VI of the NPT, which states 
the following: 
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good 
faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at 
an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and 
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.84  
Other advocates of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty focus on the technical 
feasibility of maintaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent under the test ban while monitoring 
the compliance of other states.  George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger 
and Sam Nunn have advocated “initiating a bipartisan process with the Senate, including 
understandings to increase confidence and provide for periodic review, to achieve 
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, taking advantage of recent technical 
advances, and working to secure ratification by other key states.”85 
Recent technical advances include scientific studies on the effects of U.S. nuclear 
warhead aging and on the ability to detect warhead defects, as well as improvements in 
the ability to detect clandestine nuclear tests performed by other states.  The 2006 
JASON report concluded that the primary-stage fissile materials in the core explosive 
elements (also known as “pits”) are reliable in most stockpile weapons for more than 100 
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years, a period much longer than originally postulated.86  A 2002 National Academy of 
Sciences study also determined that a properly resourced Stockpile Stewardship Program 
could ensure the long-term safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile within the 
constraints of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
It seems to us that the argument to the contrary—that is, the argument that 
improvements in the capabilities that underpin confidence in the absence 
of nuclear testing will inevitably lose the race with the growing needs 
from an aging stockpile—underestimates the current capabilities for 
stockpile stewardship, underestimates the effects of current and likely 
future rates of progress in improving these capabilities, and overestimates 
the role that nuclear testing ever played (or would ever be likely to play) in 
ensuring stockpile reliability.87 
Richard Garwin testified before Congress in 2009 that he expects a properly resourced 
stockpile stewardship program to actually increase confidence in the reliability of 
existing nuclear warheads. 
I believe that the existing weapons can remain closer to their test pedigree 
than a replacement weapon will be to any specific nuclear test, and that 
responsible choice of modifications to the existing weapons would result 
in increased confidence in the performance with time, rather than the 
erosion of confidence.88 
The 2002 report from the National Academy of Sciences and the 2006 JASON report 
provided reassurance regarding the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile and 
indicated that some concerns may have been overstated during the 1999 Senate hearings.  
The scientists involved in these studies, including Richard Garwin, believe that the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program has demonstrated its capacity to maintain, if not improve, 
the safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons without nuclear testing. 
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The 2002 National Academy of Sciences report also revealed technical advances 
in the International Monitoring System that further support the verifiability of the CTBT.  
The National Academy of Sciences panel concluded that it would be difficult for states to 
conceal any nuclear explosions greater than one or two kilotons and that the value of such 
tests would be minimal.89  As of September 2009, the IMS is over 70% complete with 
249 certified monitoring facilities and 88 more in various stages of development.90  Full 
installation of the IMS and the development of civilian seismic networks and national 
technical monitoring systems have improved the test ban verification capabilities to a 
much higher level than the stated requirement to detect a non-evasive test of one kiloton 
anywhere in the world.91  New advancements in seismometers, hydroacoustic, 
infrasound, radionuclide, and interferometric synthetic aperture radar satellite 
technologies further increase the likelihood of detection.92   
Very little of the benefit of a scrupulously observed CTBT regime would 
be lost in the case of clandestine testing within the considerable 
constraints imposed by the available monitoring capabilities.  Those 
countries that are best able to successfully conduct such clandestine testing 
already possess advanced nuclear weapons of a number of types and could 
add little, with additional testing, to the threats they already pose or can 
pose to the United States.  Countries of lesser nuclear test experience and 
design sophistication would be unable to conceal tests in the numbers and 
yields required to master nuclear weapons more advanced than the ones 
they could develop and deploy without any testing at all.93 
If the National Academy of Sciences' 2009 assessment is correct, there should be no 
reason to doubt the verifiability of the CTBT.  The completion of an effective 
International Monitoring System, coupled with a successful Stockpile Stewardship 
Program, would take away two of the three main arguments presented by CTBT skeptics. 
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D. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARGUMENT AGAINST RATIFICATION 
Opponents of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty may acknowledge the 
technological advancements related to verification of compliance with the treaty, but 
remain skeptical about its value to U.S. national security.  From their perspective, it 
would still be possible to evade detection and, more importantly, they doubt that the 
United Nations Security Council would take adequate measures to punish treaty violators.  
Some cite the unpunished violations of the NPT by North Korea as an example of an 
international treaty that is not enforced.94 
Some are concerned that the CTBT would leave open the possibility for different 
interpretations because it does not define what constitutes a nuclear test in precise 
technical terms.  Some members of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic 
Posture of the United States opposed to CTBT ratification wrote as follows in their 2009 
report: 
[T]he treaty remarkably does not define a nuclear test.  In practice this 
allows different interpretations of its prohibitions and asymmetrical 
restrictions.  The strict U.S. interpretation precludes tests that produce 
nuclear yield.  However, other countries with different interpretations 
could conduct tests with hundreds of tons of nuclear yield—allowing them 
to develop or advance nuclear capabilities with low-yield, enhanced 
radiation, and electro-magnetic-pulse.... With no agreed definition, U.S. 
relative understanding of these capabilities would fall further behind over 
time and undermine our capability to deter tactical threats against allies.95 
The congressional commission made the following unanimous recommendations to the 
Obama administration. 
To prepare the way for Senate re-review of the CTBT, the administration 
should prepare a comprehensive net assessment of benefits, costs, and 
risks; secure P-5 agreement on a clear and precise definition of banned and 
permitted test activity; define a diplomatic strategy for entry into force; 
and prepare a budget that adequately funds the safeguards program.96 
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This statement from a bipartisan commission indicates that the CTBT, in its present form, 
is unacceptable to many U.S. experts.  A definition of what constitutes a nuclear test, 
agreed upon by the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, may be 
a prerequisite for the U.S. Senate to provide its advice and consent to the ratification of 
the CTBT. 
Stephen Rademaker, an Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, 
International Security and Non-Proliferation during the George W. Bush administration, 
also noted that disagreement on the definition of prohibited tests among the permanent 
five (P-5) members of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Russia, the 
United Kingdom and the United States) could preclude CTBT ratification.  He wrote, 
"Senate resistance to the CTBT certainly will increase if this issue cannot be resolved."97  
Senator Jon Kyl (R-Arizona) has already raised this argument for not acceding to the 
treaty: 
The CTBT then [in 1999], as now, does not define what it purports to ban, 
which is nuclear-weapons testing.  This leaves countries free to interpret 
the treaty (and act) as they see fit.  Thus, if the U.S. ratified the treaty, it 
would be held to a different standard than other nations.98 
Senator Kyl voted against the CTBT in 1999 and promises to lead the opposition if the 
Obama administration resubmits the CTBT to the Senate for its advice and consent in the 
near future. 
Skeptics regarding the CTBT are also resistant to the treaty because they continue 
to regard it as worthless or even detrimental to non-proliferation efforts.  Members of the 
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States opposed to 
CTBT ratification argued that "There is no demonstrated linkage between the absence of 
U.S. testing and non-proliferation."99  The Center for Security Policy’s New Deterrent 
Working Group also produced a 2009 report, which stated that the aging of nuclear 
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warheads will eventually erode the credibility of the U.S. strategic posture and that “a 
weak American nuclear posture in fact encourages proliferation more than a strong 
one.”100 
A lack of testing may result in degrading the safety and reliability of American 
nuclear weapons.  Ratification of the treaty might also be perceived as a weakened 
resolve in the United States to use them in defense of allies, if necessary, and further 
undermine the credibility of extended deterrence.  The New Deterrent Working Group 
noted that “some of our allies and friends who formerly relied on the U.S. ‘nuclear 
umbrella’ for protection could feel constrained to join these proliferators, in part as a 
result of their loss of confidence in our outdated arsenal and ability or will to use it.”101 
The lack of comprehensive testing may eventually erode confidence in the 
reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons.  Radioactive decay and chemical interactions within 
the explosive materials and other components eventually cause warheads to lose the 
properties required to produce nuclear explosions.  Continuous refurbishments may also 
introduce changes to the warheads’ characteristics outside the original design limits.  The 
current commander of the United States Strategic Command, Air Force General Kevin 
Chilton, commented on the “growing uncertainty about the stockpile’s future reliability” 
during his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2009 and called the 
aging nuclear weapons stockpile and complex a “most urgent concern.”102 
The warhead pits analyzed by the 2006 JASON Report comprise one component 
of the weapons, but repeated refurbishments are causing an increasing amount of 
uncertainty regarding the operational reliability of other components of the weapons.  As 
noted in the Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of 
the United States, “there are increasing concerns about how long such confidence will 
remain as the process of re-inspecting and remanufacturing these weapons continues.  
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Indeed, laboratory directors have testified that uncertainties are increasing.”103  Skeptics 
regarding the treaty note that the CTBT would be of indefinite duration, and that it might 
be politically difficult—in domestic and international terms—to withdraw from the 
treaty. 
E. SUMMARY 
International events and political developments over the past decade have 
significantly changed the landscape for nuclear proliferation.  Interpretations of these 
developments and the possible effects the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty might have on 
future non-proliferation efforts are open to debate.  For skeptics regarding the CTBT, 
maintaining the safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons and the credibility of their 
deterrence value continue to outweigh the positive effects, if any, the treaty might have 
on the non-proliferation regime.  Meanwhile, proponents of the treaty have made 
significant efforts to allay such concerns by claiming success in the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program’s ability to identify and remedy any defects in U.S. nuclear 
weapons.  Proponents also hold that new technologies have improved and will continue 
to improve the Stockpile Stewardship Program as well as the International Monitoring 
System, mitigating the risks of the CTBT, and making it effectively verifiable. 
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT DEBATE 
A. THE UNITED STATES SENATE 
The previous three chapters have shown that key issues in the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty debate have not changed since 1999, but that technological advances 
have improved the International Monitoring System and the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program.  Proponents of the CTBT tend to focus on the potential non-proliferation 
benefits of the treaty, while opponents of the CTBT tend to focus on the risks it might 
pose to the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrence posture.  Changes in the geopolitical 
environment have also provided new arguments for both sides of the debate as events can 
be interpreted in different ways depending on one’s perspective.  To some, the CTBT 
now seems more verifiable, the U.S. nuclear stockpile more credible, and the prospect of 
bolstering non-proliferation efforts through ratification of the CTBT more necessary.  To 
others, the treaty still seems unverifiable and/or unenforceable, the U.S. nuclear stockpile 
less credible, and the prospects of nuclear proliferation worsened by a weakening U.S. 
extended deterrence posture.   
Some observers argue, however, that the voting of U.S. Senators is more likely to 
be influenced by partisan politics than by any technological advancements or 
developments in the international system.104  This chapter discusses key political aspects 
of the debate and identifies potential tradeoffs that could be made to secure—or block—
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
The biggest advantage for proponents of the CTBT is the current composition of 
the Senate with respect to political parties.  It is hardly coincidental that Democratic 
senators provided 44 of the 48 votes supporting ratification of the CTBT in 1999 and that 
Republican senators provided all 51 votes against it.  (Senator Robert Byrd, D-West 
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Virginia, voted “present.”)105  Appendix A depicts the voting of all senators who 
considered providing advice and consent to ratification of the CTBT in 1999. 
Advice and consent to ratification of an international treaty, such as the CTBT, 
requires a two-thirds majority from the U.S. Senate.  The current U.S. Senate includes 58 
Democrats and 40 Republicans.106  Independent Democrat Joseph Lieberman from 
Connecticut and Independent Bernie Sanders from Vermont could each be expected to 
vote with the Democrats on this issue.  Therefore, at least seven votes would be required 
from Republican senators to achieve a two-thirds majority to provide advice and consent 
to the ratification of the CTBT, as shown in Table 2.  (The governor of Massachusetts 
appointed Paul Kirk, D-Massachusetts, as a temporary replacement in the Senate after the 
death of Senator Ted Kennedy, but a general election in January 2010 will determine a 
new incumbent through 2012.)107  The current list of 40 Republican senators includes 23 
that were serving in 1999 and voted to reject CTBT ratification, and none of the four that 
voted in support of CTBT ratification. 
 
Incumbent Democrats in the Senate 57 
Independents (Caucus with Democrats) 2 
Senator Kennedy's Replacement 1 
Additional Republican Votes Required 7 
Votes Required for Treaty Ratification 67 
Table 2.   Hypothetical Voting Required by Current U.S. Senate to Ratify CTBT. 
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Some Republican senators may see value in the improved International 
Monitoring System and the Stockpile Stewardship Program, but they are unlikely to be 
swayed by these improvements alone.  They will still have concerns about verification or 
enforcement of the CTBT and its possible long-term effects on the U.S. deterrence 
posture and nuclear proliferation.  The Minority Whip, Senator Jon Kyl (R-Arizona), 
recently remarked on his continued opposition to the CTBT: 
There are good reasons why the test-ban treaty has not been ratified…. [I]t 
is simply not verifiable.  It also failed because of an understandable 
reluctance on the part of the U.S. Senate to forgo forever a test program 
that could in the future be of critical importance for our defense and the 
defense of our allies.108 
Senator Kyl and other Republican senators have raised valid concerns over the long-term 
implications of the CTBT.  Technological advancements in verification measures and 
stockpile stewardship will not address all of their concerns, but some might be persuaded 
by other means, such as safeguards. 
B. SAFEGUARDS 
Even if all major concerns were addressed on substantive grounds, some 
Republicans might view the CTBT as an important bargaining chip to use against the 
Democratic majority.  The Republican Party could view ratification of the CTBT without 
any major concessions on the part of the Democrats as a missed opportunity.  Some 
observers argue that “safeguards” might be an effective means to mitigate perceived risks 
associated with the treaty and that they might serve as an important bargaining range for 





108 Jon Kyl and Richard Perle, "Our Decaying Nuclear Deterrent," The Wall Street Journal, 30 June 
2009: A13. 
109 Medalia, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: "Safeguards," 1–2. 
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ubjective. 
                                                
The safeguards package put forth by the Clinton administration during the 1999 
debate included the following six provisions: 
1. Ensure the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile with the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program. 
2. Provide adequate resources to the nuclear laboratories and programs. 
3. Maintain a nuclear testing capability. 
4. Continue research and development programs for nuclear warheads. 
5. Improve intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities. 
6. Set conditions for withdrawal from the treaty.110 
One problem with the safeguards presented in 1999, however, is that they contain no 
metrics to ensure adequate implementation.111  Assessing compliance with the 
safeguards remains completely s
Technically, the 1999 safeguards listed were never invoked because the CTBT 
was rejected.  Nevertheless, similar safeguards were already in place from previous 
treaties and agreements.  While the Senate alone provides advice and consent for the 
ratification of international treaties, the U.S. House of Representatives would also be 
involved in defining budget authorizations and appropriations for programs required by 
the treaty and its safeguards.  A consistent complaint on both sides of the CTBT debate 
has been that the nuclear complex, including facilities and personnel, has received 
inadequate funding and is in need of immediate attention.112  Some have proposed the 
creation of a “safeguard for the safeguards”—a congressionally mandated organization or 
committee to ensure that the safeguards continue to receive adequate resourcing.113 
 
110 Medalia, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: "Safeguards," 21–24. 
111 Jonathan Medalia, "Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Safeguards," Presentation to the National 
Academy of Sciences Conference on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Committee, 9 September 2009 
(Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 2009). 
112 America's Strategic Posture, 50–51. 
113 Medalia, "CTBT Safeguards," Presentation to NAS, 9 September 2009. 
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It is possible that some Republican senators with keen interests in the nuclear 
complex could be persuaded to vote in favor of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty if 
they were given adequate reassurances by safeguards to protect programs that directly 
affect their constituencies and support bases as well as U.S. national security interests.  
New weapons development programs or increased funding of the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program could serve this purpose.  These types of concessions might be seen as contrary 
to the spirit of the CTBT or the NPT, and the compromise might not be worth the price to 
supporters of these treaties. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Debates about nuclear weapons and testing have been a part of American politics 
for over sixty years.  The renewed interest in U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty represents the latest round in these debates.  The 1999 vote on the CTBT was 
divided along party lines in the U.S. Senate because of different perspectives regarding 
the verifiability of the treaty and its anticipated effects on U.S. nuclear deterrence and 
worldwide nuclear proliferation.  Democrats generally viewed U.S. ratification of the 
CTBT as beneficial to U.S. national security because they hoped it would improve 
international relations and provide a boost to international non-proliferation efforts.  They 
regarded the International Monitoring System as sufficient for deterring violations of the 
treaty.  They also contended that the Stockpile Stewardship Program was good enough to 
forgo nuclear testing. 
Republicans were generally much less certain about the prospects for maintaining 
international stability under the restrictions that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
would have imposed.  They were not convinced that the Stockpile Stewardship Program 
and the International Monitoring System (or national technical means) could detect 
violations or that the United Nations Security Council would take action against violators 
in order to ensure long-term strategic stability.  They contended that the CTBT would 
have weakened the U.S. nuclear deterrent more rapidly than it might have affected at 
least some other nuclear-armed states, upsetting the balance of power and thereby 
inviting nuclear proliferation. 
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Technological advancements in the last decade have improved the ability to 
monitor the degradation of existing nuclear weapons as well as the ability to detect 
underground nuclear tests around the world.  Undoubtedly, these technologies and 
processes will continue to improve.  What is not certain, however, is what changes will 
occur in the geopolitical environment or how others will interpret those changes.  
Proponents of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty are likely to continue to view it as 
crucial to nuclear non-proliferation efforts and effectively verifiable with minimal effects 
on the U.S. strategic deterrence posture.  Meanwhile, opponents of the treaty are likely to 
continue to view it as unverifiable or unenforceable and detrimental to U.S. strategic 
deterrence and non-proliferation efforts. 
Any future vote on the CTBT in the U.S. Senate will depend heavily on partisan 
politics, as it did in 1999.  Technical advancements, significant as they may be, are not as 
likely to sway the opinions of senators as compromises made to address the risks of the 
treaty and to improve support for the U.S. nuclear complex.  If it seeks to rally the 
required number of votes in the U.S. Senate, the Obama administration should conduct a 
study of which Republican senators could be influenced by concessions in the form of 
safeguards to more adequately address concerns about the U.S. nuclear stockpile, the 
credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, and international treaty compliance.  Even with a 
reconstructed safeguards package, the outcome of a future vote on the CTBT in the U.S. 
Senate may be difficult to forecast. 
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APPENDIX 1999 CTBT VOTE IN THE U.S. SENATE114 
Yeas (48) Nays (51) "Present" 
(1) 
Akaka Feinstein Mikulski Abraham Fitzgerald McCain Byrd 
Baucus Graham Moynihan Allard Frist McConnell  
Bayh Harkin Murray Ashcroft Gorton Murkowski  
Biden Hollings Reed Bennett Gramm Nickles  
Bingaman Inouve Reid Bond Grams Roberts  
Boxer *Jeffords Robb Brownback Grassley Roth  
Breaux Johnson Rockefeller Bunning Gregg Santorum  
Bryan Kennedy Sarbanes Burns Hagel Sessions  
*Chafee Kerrey Schumer Campbell Hatch Shelby  
Cleland Kerry *Smith 
(OR) 
Cochran Helms Smith 
(NH) 
 
Conrad Kohl *Specter Collins Hutchinson Snowe  
Daschle Landrieu Torricelli Coverdell Hutchison Stevens  
Dodd Lautenberg Wellstone Craig Inhofe Thomas  
Dorgan Leahy Wyden Crapo Kyl Thompson  
Durbin Levin  DeWine Lott Thurmond  
Edwards Lieberman  Domenici Lugar Voinovich  
Feingold Lincoln  Enzi Mack Warner  
*Denotes Republican vote of yea.  (Senator Specter switched to Democrat in 2009). 
Shaded boxes denote senators who are no longer in office. 
 
                                                 
114 Mahoney, Nuclear Stockpile, Table 2-1. 
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